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COMMENT




Judgment recognition and enforcement are typically not topics of
much concern where the parties, the claim, the court, the laws, and the
assets are located within the same country. In such cases, the laws of
that country will govern the process by which judgments are obtained
and executed.
These issues take on paramount importance, however, where the
judgment creditor must execute a judgment against assets located in a
foreign country. Where domestic judgments transcend the realm of
the sovereign, their fate becomes uncertain. Notions of international
comity have supplemented and stabilized foreign judgments to some
degree.' Yet, for many years, countries such as England have sought
to increase the currency of their domestic judgments by entering into
and maintaining reciprocal foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement treaties with other signatory countries.2 Under these trea-
ties, judgments may be registered within the courts of foreign signa-
tory countries and given reciprocal effect if certain minimal statutory
requirements are met.3
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1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part III.A.
3. Id.
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The United States is not a party to any such treaty.4 Nor is there
any federal law that recognizes and enforces foreign nation judgments
by way of registration.' Surprisingly, individual states currently pos-
sess the exclusive authority to shape foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement procedures within their respective borders. Conse-
quently, to enforce a foreign judgment within American courts, a
judgment creditor must file a fresh cause of action against the judg-
ment debtor pursuant to the laws of the recognizing state.6 The
resulting patchwork of varying state approaches is confusing to the
average foreign judgment creditor 7 and deficient when compared to
the efficiency of the English scheme.
Recently, attempts to cure this deficiency via international con-
vention have taken a back seat as the United States shifts its attention
toward the enactment of federal legislation that would significantly re-
shape the American scheme of foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement. If enacted, such legislation would dispense with the neces-
sity of filing a fresh cause of action to enforce a foreign judgment and
provide foreign judgment creditors with the option of enforcing their
judgments by way of registration.
Part II of this Comment provides some background on the cur-
rent American scheme of foreign judgment recognition and enforce-
ment by comparing and contrasting its three major components-
American common law, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
Part III tracks the English scheme of foreign judgment recognition
and enforcement from its common law origin to its more sophisticated
and streamlined foreign judgment registration system. Finally, Part
IV suggests that the United States could benefit from the implementa-
tion of federal legislation that would bring foreign judgment registra-
tion procedures to American courts and provide for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments on a national level.
4. Juan Carlos Martinez, Recognition and Enforcing Foreign Nation Judgments: The United
States and Europe Compared and Contrasted A Call for Revised Legislation in Florida, 4 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 49, 50 (1995).
5. See id. at 51.
6. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, United States of America, in
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 123 (Charles Platto & William G.
Horton eds., 2nd ed. 1994).
7. See Linda J. Silberman et al., A Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Coun-
try Judgments, An International Treaty, and An American Statute, 75 IND. L. J. 635, 636 (2000).
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II. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
While U.S. law clearly recognizes and enforces sister-state judg-
ments, the law concerning most foreign judgments is less uniform.
The United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the ... judicial Proceedings of every
other State ... ."' The protection this clause provides, however, is ac-
corded only to sister-state judgments. There is no constitutional re-
quirement that states extend similar recognition or enforcement to the
decisions of foreign tribunals.9 It may also surprise many to "learn
that no federal law governs the enforcement of foreign-country judg-
ments, and indeed that even in federal courts, state law rather than
federal law applies to this subject."" °
Despite the lack of a federal treaty or constitutional mandate ad-
dressing the issue, the United States is perceived as among the more
liberal countries with regard to enforcing foreign nation judgments."1
This status has been achieved largely though well founded notions of
international comity and a national willingness to enforce foreign
judgments "grounded on principles of justice similar to those recog-
nized under United States laws."' 2
A. The Current American Scheme
While the current American scheme consists of an enigmatic
patchwork of various common law and state statutory regimes,13 the
basic principles of recognition and enforcement are substantially the
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
9. Martinez, supra note 4, at 51. It is worth noting here that the concepts of recognition
and enforcement are not synonymous. Id. at 49. If a judgment is fairly litigated in the rendering
state it will generally be considered ("recognized") as conclusive on the issue tried. Id. Once a
foreign judgment is "recognized," it will become enforceable pursuant to the laws of the recog-
nizing forum. Id. Thus, recognition and enforcement, though interrelated, are two independent
steps that the judgment creditor must take in order to execute a foreign judgment. However, for
the purpose of this Comment, the terms shall be used interchangeably.
10. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 123.
11. Id. "Ordinarily, a final judgment issued by a foreign-country court can be recognised
(sic) without any special proceedings, and can be enforced by a simple action against a judgment
debtor, typically by motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint." Id. See also Enforcing
Foreign Judgments in the United States and Obtaining United States Judgments That Are Enforceable
Abroad, in 1 ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED
STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 2 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992) [hereinafter ENFORCING
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS].
12. Gregory S. Paley, Judgments in the United States, in 2202.001 INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS 2202.009 (Gregory S. Paley ed.,
1994). "The principle of comity is somewhat akin to full faith and credit except that, rather than
being governed by statute, the application of comity lies solely within the discretion of the trial
judge." Id.
13. See infra Part II.A.
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same throughout the United States.' 4 The next section discusses these
principles, beginning with their origin, in order to delineate and exam-
ine the current American approach to foreign judgment recognition.
1. American Common Law
Few, if any, state or federal cases addressing the issue of foreign
judgment recognition fail to cite the 1895 United States Supreme
Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot.is In Hilton, the Supreme Court es-
tablished the basic United States common law principles pertaining to
enforcement of foreign nation judgments. 6 The case involved a
French judgment rendered against two United States citizens.'" Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Gray noted that in the absence of a "treaty
or a statute of this country," the "duty still rests upon the judicial tri-
bunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is .... ","
Recognizing that concepts of sovereignty place limits on the ex-
traterritorial effect of a nation's judgment, Justice Gray asserted:
The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within
its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by
judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion
of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have
been content to call "the comity of nations."' 9
According to Justice Gray, a fundamental prerequisite to the ex-
ercise of comity is the requirement that the judgment be "rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings
and due notice. '"20 Justice Gray went on to frame the general Ameri-
can rule of comity as follows:
14. See infra Part II.A-B.
15. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 3.
16. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
17. Id. at 114. In Hilton, two United State citizens were successfully sued in a French court
by an official liquidator of a French firm. Id. The plaintiff then sought enforcement of the
judgment in the defendants' home state of New York. Id. The District Court directed a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $277,775.44. Id. at 122.
18. Id. at 162.
19. Id. at 163. Justice Gray added the following:
'Comity' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of an-
other nation, have due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to in-
ternational duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other per-
sons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 166-67. According to Justice Gray, "such jurisdiction, proceedings, and notice
will be assumed." Id. at 167. "It will also be assumed that they are untainted by fraud . I..." Id
[Vol. 26:591
2003] Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts 595
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen
of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a
sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due
from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment
appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having ju-
risdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allega-
tions and proof, and opportunity to defend against them, and its
proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurispru-
dence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment
is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter ad-
judged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in
the foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for im-
peaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected by
fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of international law,
and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given
full credit and effect.2'
Ultimately, the Hilton Court refused to domesticate the French
judgment on the ground that there was no showing that French courts
would grant reciprocal treatment to judgments of the United States.22
As such, "the comity of our nation" did not require the Court "to give
conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France."23
Following a lengthy exploration of the rules of reciprocity as they
pertain to the enforcement schemes of various nations, Justice Gray
concluded that:
The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to
be that judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign
country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable
upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive ef-
fect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evi-
dence only of the justice of the plaintiff s claim.
24
21. Id. at 205-06. Justice Gray added, "[T]here is no doubt that... a foreign judgment
may be impeached for fraud." Id. at 206.
22. Id. at 161.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 227. Justice Gray added that:
In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of
the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one
person by reason of injustice done to anther, but upon the broad ground that interna-
tional law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of in-
ternational law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own
country, which it is our judicial duty to know and declare, the judgment is not entitled
to be considered conclusive.
Id. at 228.
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Finding no statute or treaty to the contrary, Justice Gray asserted
that it was "unwarrantable to assume that the comity of the United
States requires anything more. "
25
In the many years following the Court's decision in Hilton, most
courts, both state and federal, have adhered to and echoed the Court's
basic holding. 26 However, despite the Court's unequivocal mandate
that reciprocity be established as a precondition to the domestication
of a foreign nation judgment by an American court, the vast majority
of states have refused to recognize lack of reciprocity as a defense to
recognition. 27 Nevertheless, as the next few sections illustrate, the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, judicial decisions, and
state statutes "have continued to be built upon the other requirements
extracted from the comity analysis in Hilton.' '21 While a state-by-state
analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment, a basic overview is
helpful in understanding the fundamental components of the Ameri-
can approach to foreign judgment recognition and enforcement.
2. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Law reflect the majority common
law approach regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign na-
tion judgments within the United States. 29 However, for the purposes
of this Comment, discussion will be limited to the provisions of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.3" Thus, all references
to the Restatement will be references to the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law.
As mentioned, the Restatement encapsulates "the prevailing
common and statutory law of the States of the United States, not rules
of federal or international law."31 As comment a to section 481 of the
Restatement points out:
25. Id. at 228.
26. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 5-6.
27. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 124. However, there are at least seven states (Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Texas) that continue to insist that
reciprocity be established. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4,
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions, 13 U.L.A. 261 (2001), [hereinafter "the Uniform Act"]. For a
recent detailed analysis of why the Court's reciprocity holding in Hilton should be overruled see
Maloy & Desamparados M. Nisi, A Message to the Supreme Court: the Next Time You Get a
Chance, Please Look at Hilton v. Guyot; We Think it Needs Repairing, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
1 (1999).
28. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 5-6.
29. Martinez, supra note 4, at 64-65.
30. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 481-86 (1987) [hereinafter "the Restatement"].
31. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481 cmt. a.
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Since Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188
(1938), it has been accepted that in the absence of a federal stat-
ute or treaty or some other basis for federal jurisdiction, such as
admiralty, recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments is a matter of State law, and an action to enforce a
foreign country judgment is not an action arising under the laws
of the United States. Thus, State courts, and federal courts ap-
plying State law, recognize and enforce foreign country judg-
ments without reference to federal rules.
32
While the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
by its own statutory text covers only judgments denying or granting a
"sum of money, '3 3 the Restatement may be applied to domesticate fi-
nal foreign judgments "establishing or confirming the status of a per-
son, or determining interests in property" as well as those granting or
denying monetary awards. 34 However, the Restatement and the Uni-
form Act are similar in that they both expressly exclude tax and penal
judgments, 31 as well as judgments for support in matrimonial or family
matters 36 from their scope of application.
For example, if the judgment debtor fails to raise a recognized
ground for non-recognition,37 such a judgment "is conclusive between
the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United
States."' 38 Once the judgment is domesticated under section 481(1) of
the Restatement, section 481(2) provides that the judgment "may be
enforced by any party or its successors or assigns against any other
party, its successors or assigns, in accordance with the procedures for
enforcement of judgments applicable where enforcement is sought.
39
However, unlike the current English scheme,4" neither the Uni-
form Act nor the Restatement provides for the enforcement of foreign
judgments by way of judgment registration.41 As a result, "enforce-
ment of a debt arising out of a foreign judgment must be initiated by
civil action, and the judgment creditor must establish a basis for the
32. Id.
33. See infra Part II.A.3. "Although [the Uniform Act] is limited to money judgments,
nothing in the Act or in the practice of courts in the United States prevents recognition of other
kinds of judgments." The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481 Reporters' Notes, 2.
34. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481(1). It is also important to note that the practical
impact is that "as to the matters actually litigated and determined between the parties, the judg-
ment precludes relitigation (claim preclusion)." Id. Reporters' Notes, 3.
35. Compare Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 1(2) and the Restatement, supra note 30, § 483.
36. Compare Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 1(2) and the Restatement, supra note 30, § 486.
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481(1).
39. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481(2).
40. Seeinfra Part III.A.
41. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481 cmt. i.
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exercise of jurisdiction by the enforcing court over the judgment
debtor or his property.
'' 2
As the following section illustrates, the language, as well as the
scope, of the Restatement closely mirrors that of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act. While both the Restatement and
the Uniform Act seek to distil and unify the comity analysis estab-
lished in Hilton,43 the Uniform Act takes the additional step of being
subject to legislative enactment.
3. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
In an attempt to distil the common law practice of U.S. foreign
judgment recognition into a workable statutory construct, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform and the American Bar As-
sociation approved the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recogni-
tion Act in 1962. 44 The purpose of the Act is to "make it more likely
that judgments rendered in a state that adopted the Act will be recog-
nized abroad, since in a large number of civil-law countries, the grant-
ing of conclusive effect to money judgment from foreign courts is
made dependent on reciprocity."4 The Act was also intended to pro-
vide uniformity among enacting states.4 6 By establishing a set list of
criteria to help guide a court's decision whether to grant or deny con-
clusive effect to a foreign judgment within its jurisdiction, the Act
seeks to:
balance each state's desire to enforce only those judgments that
accord with its own specific laws, with the understanding that
the world contains many different cultures and legal systems,
whose judicial decisions and legislative enactments may be com-
pletely unlike American court determinations and state statutes
and regulations, but that court rulings emanating therefrom may
nonetheless be worthy of recognition.47
Since its inception, twenty-nine states have adopted the Uniform
Act,4 8 making it the majority approach to foreign judgment domestica-
42. The Restatement, supra note 30, § 481 cmt. g.
43. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 10.
44. Jay M. Zitter, J.D., Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88 A.L.R.5th 545 (2001).
45. Id.
46. See generally Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 8 ("This Act shall be so construed as to ef-
fectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.").
47. Zitter, supra note 44.
48. These states are Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (Michie 2001); California,
CAL. CIV. PRO CODE §§ 11713-1713.8 (West 2001); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-62-
101 to-109 (2001); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 10, §§ 4801-08 (2001); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ch. 55.601-607 (2001); Georgia, GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 9-12-110 to-117 (2001); Hawaii,
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tion within the United States. To understand its scope of application,
it is useful to examine various judicial decisions that have sought to
interpret the Act's statutory text.
Section one of the Act defines "foreign judgment" as "any judg-
ment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of
money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a
judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters."49 The term
"foreign state" is broadly defined to encompass "any governmental
unit other than the United States, or any state, district, common-
wealth, territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal
Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Is-
lands."" °
In order for a foreign judgment to fall within the ambit of the
Uniform Act, section two requires that it be "final and conclusive and
enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pend-
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658C-1--C-9 (2001); Illinois, 735 Ill. COMP. STAT. 5/12-618 to-626
(2001); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 626B.1--B.8 (2001); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
8501-09 (West 2001); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-701 to-709 (West
2001); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A (2001); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 691.1151-59 (2001); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 548.35 (2001); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 511.770-.787 (2001); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-601 to-609 (2001); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:49A-16-A-24 (West 2001); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
39-4B-1-- B9 (Michie 2001); New York, N.Y C.P.L.R §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 2001); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1C-1800-08 (2001); Ohio, Ohio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90-
.94 (Anderson 2001); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (2001); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 24.200-.255 (2001); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 42 §§ 22001-09 (2001);
Texas, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-008 (Vernon 2001); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.6-465.13 (Michie 2001); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§
6.40.010-915 (2001). The Act has also been adopted in the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-381 to-388 (2001); as well as the Virgin Islands, 5 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 561-569
(2001).
49. Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 1(2). Applying this definition literally, one court con-
cluded that a judgment that merely rendered a contract void did not constitute a "recovery for a
sum of money" and therefore was not entitled to recognition under the Act. See Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Adminstratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 962 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). On the other hand,
section one's exemption for taxes, fines, and penalties has been given a slightly more liberal con-
struction. So long as the judgment can be classified as remedial, rather than punitive, it will gen-
erally be recognized. See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73 (D. Mass.
1987); Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. 1992). The court in Hoff-
man concluded that "whether a judgment is a 'fine or other penalty' depends on whether its pur-
pose is remedial in nature, affording a private remedy to an injured person, or penal in nature,
punishing an offense against the public justice." Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. at 75-76.
50. Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 1(1). Section one's use of the phrase "other than the
United States" has been interpreted as excluding judgments of sister states from the scope of the
Act. See G&R Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 898 P.2d 50 (Idaho 1995); Krontiz v. Fifth Ave.
Dance Studio, Inc., 249 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. 1978); Mueller v. Payn, 352 A.2d 895 (Md. App. 1976).
Contra Elkhart Co-op. Equity Exch. v. Hicks, 823 P.2d 223 (Kan. App 1991); Jacoby v. Jacoby,
258 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. App. 1979).
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ing or is subject to appeal."51 Neither the Restatement nor the Uni-
form Act distinguishes between adversarial and default judgments. 2
Whether or not a foreign judgment is "final and conclusive and en-
forceable where rendered" under section two of the Uniform Act is an
issue that must be resolved by applying the law of the foreign coun-
try. 
3
If the foreign judgment is found to have met section two's con-
clusiveness requirements (and barring any statutory ground for non-
recognition),54 section three provides that the judgment will be consid-
ered "conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or de-
nies recovery of a sum of money." 5 Such a finding renders the foreign
judgment "enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit. '"56
As previously mentioned, notions of international comity rather
than constitutional obligation supplement the recognition of foreign
nation judgments at American common law. 7 As such, the Uniform
Act should be viewed as the floor, rather than the ceiling, for the pur-
pose of foreign judgment domestication." As the Fourth Circuit
noted in Guiness PLC v. Ward, the Uniform Act:
[D]elineates a minimum of foreign judgments which must be rec-
ognized in jurisdictions which have adopted the Act, and in no
51. Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 2. However, where the court is satisfied that either an
appeal is pending, or that the defendant is both entitled to and plans to appeal from the foreign
judgment, section 6 provides that proceedings may be stayed "until the appeal has been deter-
mined or until the expiration of a period of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute
the appeal." Id. at § 6. In light of section two's conclusive implications, two courts have found
the Act's lack of a statutory mechanism for providing a judgment debtor notice or the ability to
establish grounds for non-recognition violates due process. See Plastics Eng'g Inc. v. Diamond
Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App. 1989); Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.
App. 1987).
52. Compare New Cent. Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade and Indus., Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d 980
(1971) and the Restatement, supra note 30, § 481 cmt. i.
53. Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App. 2001); S.C.
Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enter. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Dear v. Russo,
973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App. 1998)). In Hernandez, a Texas Court of Appeals declared that
"[i]f the judgment is not facially final, the judgment creditor bears the burden of producing evi-
dence demonstrating the judgment is final." Hernandez, 54 S.W.3d at 337 (citing Russo, 973
S.W.2d at 446). Finding such evidence to be lacking from the case at hand, the plaintiff's fa-
cially valid judgment was sufficient to support the decision of the court to affirm the trial court's
judgment in plaintiff s favor. Id.
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 3.
56. Id. The Comment to § 3 states that the "method of enforcement will be that of the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 in a state having enacted that Act."
Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 3 cmt.
57. See supra Part II.A.1.
58. See Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992).
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way constitutes a maximum limitation upon foreign judgments
which may be given recognition apart from the Act. 9
The flexibility necessary to apply this concept has been codified
in the Act's "Savings Clause," which provides, "[t]his Act does not
prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered
by this Act. '61 What results is a liberal statutory construct that tem-
pers the drafters' desire for uniformity against the courts' need for ju-
dicial discretion. However, neither the Uniform Act nor the Restate-
ment alleviates the necessity of a formal judicial proceeding prior to
the domestication of a foreign judgment. Moreover, the Act's flexibil-
ity might also contribute to substantial variances among the states re-
garding its construction and application.6'
While the Uniform Act and the Restatement parallel one another
in terms of their liberal scope of application, both continue to reinforce
62many of the common law restraints on foreign judgment recognition.
The following section delineates and compares these limitations as set
forth in both the Uniform Act and the Restatement in light of the ju-
dicial decisions that have strengthened and defined their parameters.
B. Attacks on Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts
An American court's review of a foreign judgment can be seen as
a balanced inquiry into concepts of international comity and funda-
mental notions of Americanized due process. While the former sets
the proverbial floor for analysis, the latter establishes the ceiling.
Thus, while American courts are generally willing to recognize foreign
judgments out of respect for the court of origin, recognition will be
denied where the judgment was obtained in a manner repugnant to
American jurisprudence.
The Restatement and the Uniform Act "codify the comity analy-
sis of Hilton v. Guyot in providing grounds for non-recognition of a
foreign judgment. '"63 While the grounds for non-recognitions are sub-
stantially the same under both the Restatement and the Uniform Act,
59. Id. at 884 (emphasis in original).
60. Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 7.
61. See generally Silberman, supra note 7, at 636-37.
62. See infra Part ll.B.
63. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, at 10.




treatment.6 4 The following chart provides a
Uniform Foreign Restatement (Third)
Money-Judgments of Foreign Relations
Recognition Act Law
Foundational Final and conclusive Final judgment
Requirements for and enforceable where
Recognition rendered
Mandatory Grounds Lack of due process
for Non-Recognition
Lack of personal jurisdiction
Lack of subject matter
jurisdiction
Discretionary Lack of subject matter
Grounds for jurisdiction
Non-Recognition
Insufficient notice to defendant
Fraud
Cause of action contrary to public policy
Judgment conflicts with another final judgment





The first ground for non-recognition is lack of due process. As
the chart above illustrates, lack of due process is a ground for manda-
tory non-recognition common to both the Restatement and the Uni-
form Act.6 6 On the one hand, the judgment need only comport with
general principles of due process. The mere fact that procedures im-
plemented in the foreign tribunal were not identical to that employed
in American courts will not render the judgment void under either
recognition scheme.67 On the other hand, domestication will be de-
nied where the procedure implemented in the foreign court denied the
64. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482 and The Uniform Act, supra note 27, §
4.
65. This chart is based on a chart created by Professor Ronald A. Brand. See Ronald A.
Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and
International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 266 (1991).
66. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482(1)(a) and The Uniform Act, supra note
27, § 4(a)(1).
67. Brand, supra note 65, at 271.
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defendant such fundamental American rights as access to counsel, dis-
covery, impartial tribunals and judicial review. 8
The second ground for non-recognition is lack of personal juris-
diction. Lack of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor is the
most commonly employed grounds for mandatory non-recognition
under the Uniform Act and the Restatement. 9 The foreign judgment
debtor may successfully attack personal jurisdiction in two ways.
First, neither the Uniform Act nor the Restatement allows recognition
where the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant
pursuant to the laws of the foreign country.7" Second, even where the
foreign court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with
the foreign country's laws, recognition will be denied if the defendant
lacked "minimum contacts" within the forum state and reasonable no-
tice of the pendency of the action. 1
The third ground for non-recognition is lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. While lack of subject matter is treated as a ground for
mandatory non-recognition under the Uniform Act, "it seldom pro-
vides the basis for denial of the requested use of the foreign judg-
ment."7" Often, subject matter is presumed, and the burden lies with
the judgment debtor to establish the lack of subject matter "by appli-
cation of the jurisdictional rules of the foreign court."73 Adhering to
68. See The Restatement, supra note 30, § 482 cmt b; Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201
F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995).
69. Compare The Restatement, supra note 30, § 482 cmt. c and Brand supra note 65, at 271.
70. See Brand, supra note 65, at 271.
71. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., Inc., 899 F. Supp.
1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). However, section 5(a) of the Uniform Act limits the court's discretion to
deny recognition based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and states:
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion if
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the pur-
pose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of
contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter in-
volved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings were in-
stituted or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, was incorpo-
rated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings in
the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of business
done by the defendant through that office in the foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and the
proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of such operation.
The Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 5(a).
72. Brand, supra note 65, at 273.
73. Id.
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this rationale, the Restatement diverges from the Uniform Act by list-
ing lack of subject matter as a discretionary, rather than mandatory,
ground for non-recognition.74
The fourth ground for non-recognition is insufficient notice to
the defendant. Insufficient notice is treated as ground for discretion-
ary non-recognition under both the Uniform Act and the Restate-
ment.75 Invocation of the court's discretion under either scheme is
clearly warranted where the judgment debtor received no notice of the
pendency of the action." Consistent with the liberal American
scheme, however, this discretionary ground for non-recognition has
been narrowly construed. For example, one court recognized a foreign
judgment despite alleged defects in the service of process on the basis
that the defendant was able to submit an answer and was represented
by counsel.77
The fifth ground for non-recognition is fraud. American courts
addressing allegations of fraud as a defense to domestication of a for-
eign judgment have generally limited non-recognition to instances of
extrinsic fraud.7" Extrinsic fraud occurs where "the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case as by keeping him
away from court or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit. '79 Alternately, intrinsic fraud, which relates to issues, that were
or could have been litigated before the foreign court, cannot be used to
impeach a foreign judgment.8"
The sixth ground for non-recognition may be invoked where the
cause of action is contrary to the public policy of the recognizing juris-
diction. Public policy is a discretionary ground for non-recognition
common to both the Restatement and the Uniform Act.81 There is no
requirement that judicial procedures between different nations must
be identical, or that an analogous cause of action exists between the
74. See the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482(2)(a).
75. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482(2)(b) and The Uniform Act, supra note
27, § 4(b)(1).
76. See Gondre v. Silberstein, 744 F. Supp. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York
Law).
77. See Farrow Mortg. Serv. Pty. Ltd. v. Singh, 1995 WL 809561 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995).
78. Brand, supra note 65, at 274.
79. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878). However, "[i]f the foreign
court has actually considered and determined the question of fraud, whether 'extrinsic' or 'intrin-
sic,' the facts bearing on that issue may not be subject to reexamination when enforcement is
sought in the United States." Brand, supra note 65, at 275.
80. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip. Ltd., 51 Wash. App. 749, 754 P.2d 1290
(1988); Brand, supra note 65, at 274.
81. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482(2)(d) and The Uniform Act, supra note
27, § 4(b)(3).
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recognizing state and the rendering foreign country.82 However, a
judgment rendered by a foreign court, which is either unknown or
flatly rejected by the recognizing court, will likely be rejected as
against public policy.83
The seventh ground for non-recognition is available where the
foreign judgment conflicts with a prior, inconsistent judgment. 4 Such
judgments may arise "either in the context of two conflicting foreign
judgments or of a foreign judgment in conflict with a judgment from
another United States court."8" While the latter of the two judgments
is likely to be preferred, the presiding court has discretion to recognize
the former or neither. 86 Indeed, such judicial discretion may sit un-
easy with some foreign judgment creditors. It may be equally unset-
tling, particularly for the holder of a prior inconsistent American
judgment, to learn that no principle or law requires "automatic prefer-
ence" by U.S. courts for the judgments of sister states.
87
The eighth ground for non-recognition may be invoked where
the proceedings that led to the foreign judgment were contrary to an
agreement of the parties. Both the Restatement and the Uniform Act
provide courts with the discretion to deny recognition to a foreign
judgment obtained in violation of a preexisting contractual agreement
between the parties. 88 As such, if the parties have previously agreed to
resolve disputes within a particular forum or manner, American courts
will generally respect that agreement.89
The ninth ground for non-recognition is available where the for-
eign court was a seriously inconvenient forum and jurisdiction was
based only on personal jurisdiction.9" Inconvenient forum is a discre-
82. Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App. 1997); the Restatement, supra note 30,
§482 cmt. f.
83. See Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997); Neprany v. Kir, 173 N.Y.S.2d
146 (App. Div. 1958).
84. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, § 482(2)(e) and The Uniform Act, supra note
27, §4(b)(4).
85. Brand, supra note 65, at 276.
86. The Restatement § 482, supra note 30, cmt. g.
87. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 517 F. Supp. 614, 623-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also the Re-
statement, supra note 30, § 482 cmt. g; Brand, supra note 65, at 276.
88. Compare the Restatement, supra note 30, §482(2)(0 and The Uniform Act, supra note
27, § 4(b)(5).
89. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Comment h to section
482 of the Restatement points out that "[p]arties may, however, waive the forum selection clause,
either expressly or by implication. If waiver was found by the rendering court, that determina-
tion ordinarily is binding on the court where recognition is sought." The Restatement, supra note
30, § 482 cmt. h.
90. The Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 4(b)(6). As Professor Brand notes:
This does not require that the foreign jurisdiction recognize the doctrine of forum non
conveniens as it is applied in United States courts. It rather allows the enforcing court
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tionary ground for non-recognition unique to the Uniform Act.91 The
exception section 4(b)(6) provides "is both discretionary and lim-
ited."92 Even where the foreign court proves to be a "seriously incon-
venient forum," recognition will not be withheld if jurisdiction is ef-
fectuated by means other than personal service.93
While the basic components of the American scheme were no
doubt intended to create an efficient, uniform method of foreign
judgment recognition and enforcement, efficiency and uniformity have
never truly been realized. First, actions to enforce a foreign judgment
within the United States must be initiated by filing a fresh cause of ac-
tion, thus reducing efficiency in terms of time and cost. Second, while
the majority of states have adopted the Uniform Act, the Act itself has
not been uniformly applied by the states.94 Unfortunately, absent a
single national process by which foreign judgments may be recognized
and enforced without the added cost of initiating a fresh cause of ac-
tion, the American scheme cannot hope to be either uniform or effi-
cient.
The next section analyzes how such a national scheme has been
applied successfully to increase the efficiency and uniformity of for-
eign judgment recognition and enforcement procedures in English
courts.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN ENGLAND
While sharing many of its core principles with America, the
English scheme diverges from the American scheme by elevating the
process of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement through the
implementation of international treaties. The next section analyzes
the English scheme, from its common law roots to its current, more
sophisticated, judgment registration system.
A. The Current English Scheme
Depending upon the country in which the court of original juris-
diction is situated, a judgment creditor seeking to enforce a foreign
to determine whether, if the foreign court did recognize the doctrine, the foreign court
should have dismissed on grounds of serious inconvenience.
Brand, supra note 65, at 277.
91. The Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 4(b)(6). See also Brand, supra note 65, at 277.
92. Brand, supra note 65, at 277.
93. The Uniform Act, supra note 27, § 4(b)(6). See also CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora
Hotel Corp. N.V., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2002); Farrow Mortg. Serv. Pty. Ltd.
v. Singh, 1995 WL 809561 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995); Manches & Co. v. Gilbey, 646 N.E.2d 86
(Mass. 1995).
94. See Silberman, supra note 7, at 636-37.
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judgment in England95 may encounter any of five separate sets of rules
relating to foreign judgment recognition and enforcement.9 6 These
rules may require the judgment creditor to either initiate a fresh action
at common law or simply register the judgment pursuant to the provi-
sions of bilateral or multilateral treaties.9 7 The following chart pro-




English Common any country that has no Summary judgment
Law treaty with proceedings
England
Judgments from
Administration of current and former
Justice Act 1920 commonwealth
countries
Foreign Judgments Judgments from
(Reciprocal judgment
Enforcement) Act various recognized registration
1933 courts"1933
1968 Brussels Judgments frommembers of theEuropean Union
Judgments from
1988 Lugano members of the Euro-Convention pean Union and theEuropean Free Trade
Association
At this point it may be helpful to clarify two issues that may be
raised by the above chart. First, to the extent that the provisions of
the Brussels or Lugano Convention apply, all earlier enforcement re-
gimes are displaced.9" In situations where both the Brussels and
95. This Comment will focus on England. However, it should be noted that the United
Kingdom is divided into three separate jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, and North-
ern Ireland. See Robert Lee & Nicholas Lee & Edwards, Recognition and Enforcement in English
Law of Money Judgments from Outside the UK, Supplement to I.B.F.L. 12(10), 1 (March 1994).
96. Id. at 1.
97. Seeinfra Part III.A.1-3.
98. Judy Dennis, Money Judgments in the United Kingdom, in 2201.001 INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS 2201.007-008 (Gregory S. Paley
ed., 1994).
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Lugano Conventions apply, the Brussels Convention takes precedence
in all but a few instances.99 Second, while each treaty is reciprocal and
provides for like treatment of English judgments within the various
courts of signatory countries, this Comment will focus solely on the
process by which foreign judgments are recognized and enforced in
England.
With this in mind, the next section illustrates the English scheme
of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement in a more focused
and coherent manner.
1. English Common Law
English common law governs the recognition and enforcement of
all judgments rendered by countries, such as the United States, that
have not yet entered into a reciprocal enforcement treaty with Eng-
land.100 Similar to the American common law scheme, English courts
treat foreign judgments as recognized debts at English common law,
which may be enforced through a simple summary judgment proceed-
ing. 0 ' Generally speaking, a judgment will be recognized and en-
forced at English common law if it is:
a debt or definite sum;
not payable in respect of taxes, fines or penalties;
not discredited on grounds of fraud or contrary to overriding
considerations of public policy; and
final and conclusive.
0 2
As the above list indicates, English and American common law
closely mirror one another with respect to the criteria necessary to do-
The other regimes apply where the subject matter of the judgment falls outside the
scope of the Convention. Furthermore, the Convention is only applicable when the
treaty was in force in both England and the adjudicating country at the time proceed-
ings were instituted .... If, however, the foreign proceedings commenced before the
Brussels Convention was in force in both countries but it came into effect in both by
the time judgment was given, there are transitional provisions which may make the
treaty applicable.
Id. at 2201.007.
99. See Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5. In cases where the Brussels Convention dis-
places the Lugano Convention, the distinction is only slight as both Conventions are substan-
tially the same. See Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.008.
100. Dennis Campbell & Dharmendra Popat, Enforcing American Money Judgments in the
United Kingdom and Germany, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517, 528 (1994).
101. Compare Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 1, and supra note 5.
102. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 1.
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mesticate a foreign nation judgment." 3 In addition to the prerequisite
that the judgment involve "a debt or definite sum" of money, both the
American and English schemes are uniform in their refusal to recog-
nize and enforce foreign judgments involving taxes, fines or penal-
ties.0 4 Lord Tenterden, in James v. Catherwood, found this principle
of private international law "too plain for argument." ' Lord Tenter-
den went on to state, "[i]t has been settled, ever since the time of Lord
Hardwicke that in a British court we cannot take notice of the revenue
laws of a foreign state."',
0 6
An English common law cause of action to enforce a foreign
judgment is a fairly straightforward procedure. While enforcement is
not automatic and requires a "fresh proceeding," a judgment creditor
may institute such an action by applying for summary judgment pur-
suant to Rule of Supreme Court Order 14.1"7 The majority of such ac-
tions are often informally disposed of "in chambers," where "evidence
is on affidavit and there is no prior discovery.
While the English common law scheme provides foreign judg-
ment creditors a relatively streamlined process by which they may
seek to enforce and execute their judgment, this process lacks the pre-
dictability and procedural ease provided under England's system of
judgment registration. As the next section illustrates, judgment regis-
tration is the preferred method of foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement within English courts.
2. Administration of Justice Act 1920 and Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933
Through a process of judgment registration, the Administration
of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act 1933 added greater predictability and fluidity to the Eng-
lish practice of foreign judgment enforcement.0 9 Based on principles
of English common law, these two so-called "common law" statutes
"remove the necessity to bring any fresh action against the judgment
debtor.""'  In their simplest terms, both treaties allow certain judg-
ments to be registered within foreign signatory countries, where they
103. See supra Part II.
104. Compare Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 1, and supra Part II.





110. Jeremy Carver & Christopher Napier, United Kingdom, in ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 231 (Charles Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2nd ed.
1994).
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will be given reciprocal effect if certain minimal statutory require-
ments are met."'
The Administration of Justice Act 1920 governs the registration
and enforcement of foreign money-judgments' 2 between the United
Kingdom and current or former Commonwealth countries."' The
Act, at section nine, sets out the basic rule as follows:
Where a judgment has been obtained in a superior court in any
part of His Majesty's dominions outside the United Kingdom to
which this Part of this Act extends, the judgment creditor may
apply to the High Court in England or [Northern Ireland]... or
to the Court of Session in Scotland, at any time within twelve
months after the date of the judgment, or such longer period as
may be allowed by the court, to have the judgment registered in
the court, and on any such application the court may, if all the
circumstances of the case, they think it just and convenient that
the judgment should be enforced in the United Kingdom, and
subject to the provisions of this section, order the judgment to
be registered accordingly." 4
It should be noted that registration under the 1920 Act is discre-
tionary.' 5 If the above requirements are met (and no bar to registra-
tion exists),1 16 the court may order the judgment registered, thereby
giving it "the same force and effect... as if it had been a judgment
111. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 3.
112. See Administration of Justice Act, 1920, c. 81. § 12(1) [hereinafter AJA]. According
to section 12(1):
The expression "judgment" means any judgment or order given or made by a court in
any civil proceedings, whether before or after the passing of this Act, whereby any
sum of money is made payable, and includes an award in proceedings on an arbitra-
tion if the award has, in pursuance of the law in force in the place where it was made,
become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a court in that place.
Id.
113. AJA, supra note 112, §§ 9-10, 13. These countries are: Anguilla, Antigua and Bar-
buda, Australia (save for the Australian Capital Territory), Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Ber-
muda, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Christmas Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Republic of Cyprus, Dominica, Falkland Islands,
Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati,
Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Zealand, Nigeria, Territory of
Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Helena, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sovereign Base
Area of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tasmania, Trinidad
and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Dennis, supra
note 98, at 2201.004.
114. AJA, supra note 112, § 9(1).
115. See AJA, supra note 112, §9(1). See also Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 4; Carver &
Napier, supra note 110, at 232.
116. See infra Part III.B.
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originally obtained... in the registering court."" 7  Unlike the 1933
Act,' 18 parties to the 1920 Act are not prohibited from opting to en-
force their judgments at English common law. 
119
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 is
patterned closely after the 1920 Act.1 21 It governs reciprocal enforce-
ment procedures between the United Kingdom and the various "rec-
ognised courts" of foreign countries. 2 The 1933 Act diverges from
the 1920 Act, however, in that "enforcement by registration under this
scheme is mandatory rather than discretionary .... ,112 In addition,
the 1933 Act supersedes any common law cause of action to enforce a
foreign judgment to the extent that it falls within the provisions of the
Act. 123
The basic rule of the 1933 Act has been summarized as follows:
Any judgment of a court to which the 1933 Act extends (the
'recognised court') which is final and conclusive between the
parties and payable for a sum of money, not being a sum payable
in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect
of a penalty, and which can be enforced by execution in the
country of the original courts shall be registered with the High
Court or Court of Session in Scotland or High Court in North-
ern Ireland upon application of the judgment creditor within six
years of the judgment, or if there have been proceedings by way
of appeal, after the date of the last judgment, unless:
(a) the judgment is one made by the recognised court on appeal
from a court which is not a recognised court;
117. AJA, supra note 112, § 9(3)(a).
118. See Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933 c. 13, §6 [hereinafter
FJREA] ("No proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign judgment, being a
judgment to which this Part of this Act applies, other than a proceedings by way of registration
of the judgment shall be entertained by any court in the United Kingdom.").
119. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.005.
120. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 4. See also FJREA, supra note 118, §§ 1-10. It is
worth noting that the FJREA has been rendered less important since the enactment of the Brus-
sels Convention, infra Part III.A.3, which "supersedes the FJREA in the case of Belgian, Dutch,
French, German, and Italian judgments to the extent that such judgments fall within the provi-
sions of that treaty." Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.005-06.
121. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.005. These countries are: Austria, The Austrian Capi-
tal Territory, Belgium, Canada (save for Quebec), France, Germany, Guernsey, India, Isle of
Man, Israel, Italy, Jersey, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Surinam, and Tonga. Id.
122. Id. at 2201.005. See also FJREA, supra note 118, § 2. However, the 1933 Act does
grant courts the discretion to set aside or adjourn registration where "an appeal is pending," or
the judgment debtor "is entitled and intends to appeal against the judgment .... FJREA, su-
pra note 118, § 5(1).
123. See FJREA, supra note 118, § 6.
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(b) the judgment of the recognised court is founded on a judg-
ment made or given in another country.
124
A "judgment" is defined as "a judgment given or made by a
court in any civil proceedings, or a judgment or order given or made
by a court in any criminal proceedings for the payment of a sum of
money in respect of compensation or damages to an injured party.
' 'l 2S
If the foreign judgment meets the above listed criteria (and no bar to
registration exists), 126 it shall be registered, and thereby obtain the
"same force and effect" as a judgment originally rendered by the rec-
ognizing High Court.
127
The procedures for registration under both the 1920 Act and the
1933 Act are identical and established by Order 71 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court. 128 Application for registration can be made ex parte to
the High Court via supporting affidavit. 29  The affidavit must con-
tain, inter alia, the judgment and order of the issuing court, 3 ° and in
cases in which "a sum of money is payable," the name, occupation,
and last known "abode or business of the judgment debtor .... "131
If the court issues an order granting leave to register, the judg-
ment creditor must then serve notice of registration on the judgment
debtor.132 This notice will inform the judgment debtor of his option to
contest the order, as well as the statutory time frame within which to
object. 33 If the judgment debtor wishes to have the order set aside, he
''must issue a summons within the prescribed or extended period,
124. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 232. See also FJREA, supra note 118, §§ 1-2.
125. FJREA, supra note 118, § 11(1).
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. See FJREA, supra note 118, § 2(2)(a)-(d).
128. See Rules of the Supreme Court, 1972, ord. 71 (Eng.) [hereinafter RSC]; Carver &
Napier, supra note 110, at 233.
129. RSC, supra note 128, ord. 71, r. 8, para. 18(1).
130. If the judgment or "order is not in the English language, a translation into English
certified by a notary public or authenticated by affidavit" must also be provided. RSC, supra note
128, ord. 71, § 18(1)(b).
131. RSC, supra note 128, ord. 71, r. 8, para 18(2)(a). Para. 18(2) also requires, in cases
"under which a sum of money is payable," that the affidavit state:
(b) to the best of the deponent's information and belief that at the date of the applica-
tion the European Court has not suspended enforcement of the judgment and that the
judgment is unsatisfied or, as the case may be, the amount in respect of which it re-
mains unsatisfied; and
(c) where the sum payable under the judgment is not expressed in the currency of the
United Kingdom, the amount which that sum represents in the currency of the
United Kingdom, calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing at the date when the
judgment was originally given.
RSC, supra note 128, ord. 71, r. 8, para. 18(2)(b)-(c).
132. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 233; Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 4-5.
133. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 233; Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 4-5. See
also infra Part III.B.
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supported by an affidavit setting out his reasons for objecting to the
order."'134 A hearing will then be held "before a master of the Queen's
Bench Division, with rights of appeal the same as [at English common
law]."
135
If no objection is raised, and the statutory period runs against the
judgment debtor, "the judgment may be executed by production to
the court of an affidavit of service of the notice of registration of the
judgment and of any subsequent order.
136
The judgment registration procedures established by the 1920
and 1933 Acts marked a significant step in England's evolution toward
a more efficient and uniform foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement scheme. England's accession to the Brussels Convention
marked another step. As the next section reveals, the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions added even greater efficiency to the English
practice of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement.
3. 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano Convention.
The 1968 Brussels Convention (Brussels Convention) regulates
"the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments" among all
members of the European Union (EU), including the United King-
dom. 137 The 1988 Lugano Convention (Lugano Convention) created
a "parallel regime" among members of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA), as well as certain members of the EU. 38 The pur-
pose underlying both Conventions is to "prescribe a uniform regime
134. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 233-34.
135. Id. at 234.
136. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5.
137. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.006. These members are: Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2002).
138. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5. Because of England's dual membership, a situa-
tion may arise where the registration of a judgment from another Contracting State within an
English court may trigger simultaneous application under both Conventions. If such a conflict
should arise, Article 54B of the Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [hereinafter the Lugano Convention]
provides:
(a) The Lugano Convention shall not prejudice the application of the Brussels Con-
vention by [EU] States; but
(b) The Lugano Convention will prevail where:
(i) the defendant is domiciled in an EFTA State or an EFTA State has exclusive juris-
diction under Action 16 or 17; or
(ii) 'lis pendens' or related proceedings are instituted in both an [EU] and an EFTA
State.
Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5.
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for jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in the courts of con-
tracting states.
' 139
The United Kingdom is a contracting state under both Conven-
tions. The Brussels Convention became enforceable within the
United Kingdom on January 1, 1987, pursuant to the Civil Jurisdic-
tion and Judgment Act 1982.14' The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act 1991 amended the 1982 Act to bring the Lugano Convention into
force within the United Kingdom as of May 1, 1992. "4
The enforcement procedures established by the Conventions are
far more streamlined than those existing under the earlier English
scheme. Absent from the Conventions are many of the common law-
based obstacles to enforcement, which were codified under the 1920
and 1933 Acts. This radical departure was due in part to a communal
desire among Contracting States to facilitate the "free movement" of
judgments.12 The result is a regime that favors liberal enforcement by
lowering the threshold for recognition and limiting the judgment
debtor's arsenal of defenses to enforcement.
Consistent with this approach, the general rule regarding foreign
judgment recognition is that a judgment rendered within a contracting
139. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 234. A "Contracting State" is defined as:
(a) one of the original parties to the 1968 Convention (Belgium, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands); or
(b) one of the parties acceding to that Convention under the Accession Convention
(Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), or under the 1982 Ac-
cession Convention (the Hellenic Republic) or under the 1989 Accession Convention
(Spain and Portugal), or under the 1996 Accession Convention (Austria, Finland and
Sweden) being a state in respect of which the Accession Convention has entered into
force in accordance with Article 39 of that Convention, or being a state in respect of
which the 1982 Accession Convention has entered into force in accordance with Arti-
cle 15 of that Convention, or being a state in respect of which the 1989 Accession
Convention has entered into force in accordance with Article 32 of that Convention,
or being a state in respect of which the 1996 Accession Convention has entered into
force in accordance with Article 16 of that Convention, as the case might be.
Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters [hereinafter the Brussels Convention] Part I, §3. A "Lugano Contract-
ing Party" is defined as:
(a) one of the original parties to the Lugano Convention, that is to say Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, Iceland, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; or
(b) a party who has subsequently acceded to that Convention, that is to say, Poland.
Id.
140. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, c. 27 (Eng.).
141. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1991, c. 12 (Eng.). The Lugano Convention
is by and large a replica of the Brussels Convention. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5. Thus,
for the purposes of this Comment, both Conventions will be referred to as simply "the Conven-
tions."
142. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.011.
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state, "shall be recognized in the other Contracting States without any
special procedure being required" regardless of the domicile of the
parties. 1 3  Furthermore, enforcement must be granted where the
judgment is enforceable under the laws of the contracting state in
which it was given."'
The term "judgment" is broadly defined to include "any judg-
ment given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State, whatever the
judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of
execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an offi-
cer or the court.""14 Unlike at English common law or under the 1920
or 1933 Acts, there is no requirement that the foreign judgment be fi-
nal and conclusive. 146 Moreover, unlike the American scheme, the ju-
risdictional competency of the original court is generally not subject to
review. 47 Article 29 also provides, "under no circumstances may a
foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance." '148
Once a judgment has been recognized under either Convention,
"enforcement proceedings may begin."' 49 Similar to the earlier statu-
tory regime, the procedure for foreign judgment enforcement under
the Conventions is by way of registration.' Reference to Order 71 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court must be made in substantially the
same manner as under the 1920 and 1933 Acts.15" '
The Conventions' judgment-friendly approach to foreign judg-
ment recognition and enforcement is a slight departure from English
common law, as well as from the 1920 and 1933 Acts. By lowering the
threshold necessary to find recognition, the Conventions would serve
the dual purposes of enhancing "the worth and enforceability" of for-
eign judgments and affording "legal certainty" among contracting
states.5 2 As the next section illustrates, the Conventions also depart
from the earlier English scheme by dispensing with some of the de-
143. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 26 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 26. See also David Perkins et al., Discovery in Foreign Jurisdictions; En-
forcing Judgments Abroad, SE32 ALI-ABA 191, 214 (1999);
144. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 31 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 31. See also Perkins, supra note 143, at 214.
145. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 25 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 25.
146. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 5.
147. Kathryn A. Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels
System as an Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 57, 76 (1993).
148. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 29 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 29.
149. Russell, supra note 147, at 77.
150. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 8.
151. See RSC, supra note 128, ord. 71, rr. 26, 27-28, 32.
152. See generally Martinez, supra note 4, at 70-78.
Seattle University Law Review
fenses to recognition commonly employed at English common law and
under the 1920 and 1933 Acts.
B. Attacks on Foreign Judgments in English Courts
The purpose of this section is to analyze and compare the various
grounds for non-recognition available under England's five methods
of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement-English common
law, the 1920 and 1933 Acts, and the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions.
As previously mentioned, the findings necessary to domesticate a
foreign judgment under English common law are substantially the
same as under the American common law. Such threshold findings
will not, however, prevent the judgment debtor from attacking the
judgment "on grounds of fraud on the part of the party obtaining
judgment. ' '113 In general, in an action to enforce a foreign nation
judgment, an English court will not re-try the merits of the underlying
case."5 4 Nevertheless, recognizing that a court "cannot go into the al-
leged fraud without going into the merits," an English court of appeal
in Syal v. Heywood carved out the following exception:
[I]f the fraud upon the foreign court consists of the fact that the
plaintiff has induced that court by fraud to come to a wrong
conclusion, [the judgment debtor] can reopen the whole case
even although [the judgment debtor] will have in this court to go
into the very facts which were investigated, and which were in
issue in the foreign court.1
55
Thus, unlike the American scheme, which prohibits the use of
intrinsic evidence of fraud as a ground for non-recognition, 5 6 evidence
capable of supporting an allegation of fraud under the English scheme
may consist entirely of "evidence, made available to [the judgment
debtor] before the date of the... judgment."157 Such evidence may be
fraudulent on the part of the plaintiff or on the part of the court.' 8
Public policy as a defense to foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement is seldom invoked at English common law. 9 Neverthe-
less, an English court will not enforce a foreign judgment that "is con-
153. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 2.
154. Syal v. Heyward, [1948] 2 K.B. 443, 448 (Eng. C.A.).
155. Id.
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. Syal v. Heyward, [1948] 2 K.B. 443, 449 (Eng. CA).
158. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 2.
159. Id.
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trary to or inconsistent with English policy."' 6° The standard for this
defense is somewhat high, requiring the judgment to outrage the
court's "sense of justice or decency."'' 61  As with the American
scheme, 162 the mere fact that English law lacks an analogous cause of
action to that underlying the initial judgment will not necessarily ren-
der the judgment void against English public policy.
163
In addition to the court's public policy analysis, English courts
make a second-step inquiry into whether enforcement of the foreign
judgment would breach concepts of natural justice.'64 Overlapping
with public policy considerations, and diverging somewhat from the
American scheme, 165 this seldom-invoked defense to foreign judgment
domestication, like the public doctrine, is reserved for only the most
egregious cases. 66
Conclusiveness and finality of judgment are necessary prerequi-
sites to the enforcement of the foreign judgment by an English
court.' However, similar to the American scheme, 16 English courts
retain discretion to stay common law enforcement proceedings during
an appeal of the underlying action.
69
Finally, the English court must be satisfied that the rendering
court possessed competent jurisdiction over the defendant prior to the
English domestication of a foreign judgment. 70  In determining
whether personal jurisdiction exists, the controlling issue is not
whether the English court would have claimed jurisdiction in the par-
ticular case.' 7 ' Rather, jurisdiction will generally exist only if the
judgment debtor either (1) was subject to the jurisdiction of the ren-
dering foreign court at the time proceedings were initiated; 172 or (2)
otherwise "submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
''173
160. Id. No doubt of interest to the American lawyer is the practice among English courts
of treating punitive damages as a matter of public policy. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 2.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part II.A-B.
166. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 2. This reluctance to invalidate a foreign judgment
on the ground that it would be a breach of natural justice is the result of judicial deference to the
decisions of foreign tribunals. Id.
167. Id.
168. See supra Part II.A.
169. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 2. "What is important is that all the issues concern-
ing the parties to the action have been conclusively dealt with at the first instance hearing." Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. (citing Schibsby v. Westenholtz, [1870] L.R. 6 QB. 155).
172. Id. at 3. Lee & Edwards go on to note:
Ordinarily this will require either residence or presence in the foreign country. For an in-
dividual, residence in the jurisdiction is generally required ... but this may be deemed if
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Defenses to recognition available under the 1920 and 1933 Acts
are substantially the same as those existing at English common law.
Once notice of registration is served on the judgment debtor under ei-
ther the 1920 or 1933 Act, the judgment debtor may request a hearing
be held to challenge enforcement of the judgment. 174  Similar to the
American scheme 175 both the 1920 and 1933 Acts contain a litany of
grounds upon which a judgment falling within their provisions may be
attacked by a judgment debtor. 71 Consistent with English common
law, both Acts recognize the original court's lack of jurisdiction as suf-
ficient ground to deny foreign judgment registration.177 Fraud and in-
sufficient notice to a default judgment debtor are common grounds for
that individual has his residence (ie principal home) in that country .... Mere presence of
an individual in the foreign country is now accepted as sufficient to found (sic) jurisdic-
tion .... Registration of a company will establish residence and jurisdiction, but a com-
pany may be resident though not registered. The company must be carrying on business
from a permanent base. This may take the form of a branch office, an appointed represen-
tative, or a subsidiary.
Id.
173. Lee & Edwards, supra note 95, at 3. Lee & Edwards further note:
This may be:
(a) as plaintiff or counterclaimant in the proceedings, or
(b) by way of a voluntary appearance to contest proceedings on their merits; or
(c) by way of an agreement to submit to that jurisdiction prior to commencement of
the foreign proceedings.
Id.
174. See supra Part III.A.2.
175. See supra Part 11.2-3.
176. Compare AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(a)-(e) and FJREA, supra note 118, § 4(1)(a)(i)-
(vi).
177. Compare AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(a) and FJREA, supra note 118, § 4(1)(a)(ii).
FJREA, supra note 118, §4(2) provides, in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section the courts of the country of the original court shall,
subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, be deemed to have had ju-
risdiction-
(a) in the case of a judgment given in an action in personam-
(i) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, submitted to the
jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings; or
(ii) if the judgment debtor was plaintiff in, or counter-claimed in, the proceedings
in the original court; or
(iii) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had before the
commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the pro-
ceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the courts of the country of
that court; or
(iv) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had an office or
place of business in the country of that court and the proceedings in that court were in
respect of a transaction effected through or at that office or place ....
FJREA, supra note 118, § 4(2)(a)(i)-(v).
2003] Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts 619
denial as well.' 78 Finally, a foreign judgment will not be registered
under either Act if to do so would be contrary to public policy. 79
The 1920 and 1933 Acts are not, however, uniform in their
treatment of foreign judgments subject to judicial review in the ren-
dering country.' 80 While the 1933 Act grants the registering court dis-
cretion to stay proceedings if the court is satisfied that "an appeal is
pending, or that [the judgment debtor] is entitled and intends to ap-
peal against the judgment,"'' the 1920 Act requires that registration
be denied in such cases.
182
Thus, while the 1920 and 1933 Acts diverge from one another in
some regards, both statutes provide the judgment debtor with a simi-
lar array of potential defenses to the enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment.
A judgment debtor's defenses to recognition and enforcement
under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, on the other hand, are
much narrower than those provided by either English common law or
the 1920 and 1933 Acts.1
8 3
Similar to the preexisting English scheme, a judgment falling un-
der the Conventions will not be recognized if "such recognition is con-
trary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought.'
184
While this language appears on its face to be directly analogous to that
used at English common law, "its intended operation is more circum-
scribed."' 8 15 In Hoffman v. Krieg, the European Court of Justice limited
the scope of this exception to only exceptional circumstances.
86
Both Conventions forbid recognition of a default judgment
where the defendant was not "duly served" in sufficient time to mount
178. Compare AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(a) and FJREA, supra note 118, § 4(a).
179. Compare AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(d) and FJREA, supra note 118, § 4(a)(v). It
should be noted that the public policy exception is arguably broader under the 1920 Act than
under the 1933 Act as the 1920 Act states that denial is warranted "for reasons of public policy or
for some other similar reason could not have been entertained by the registering court." AJA, supra
note 112, § 9(2)(f) (emphasis added).
180. Compare AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(e) and FJREA, supra note 118, § 5(1).
181. FJREA, supra note 118, §5(1).
182. AJA, supra note 112, § 9(2)(e).
183. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.014.
184. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(1) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(1). While neither Convention expressly mentions fraud as a
ground for non-recognition, the European Court of Justice in Owens Bank v. Bracco held that this
defense was encompassed within the Convention's public policy exception. Lee & Edwards, su-
pra note 95, at 5-6 (citing Owen Bank v. Bracco, [1994] 1 ALL ER 336).
185. Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.015.
186. Id. (citing Jenard Report No. C59/44 and Hoffman v. Krieg, [1988] E.C.R. 645);
Perkins, supra note 143, at 215.
Seattle University Law Review
a defense against the action." 7 However, the recognizing court, rather
than the court of original jurisdiction, makes the final determination
concerning sufficiency of notice and is not bound by the factual find-
ings of the original court in this regard.
188
The Conventions also contain provisions that prohibit the recog-
nition of conflicting judgments in two scenarios."19 Specifically, if the
judgment is irreconcilable with (1) "a judgment given in a dispute be-
tween the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought,"' 9 °
or (2) "an earlier judgment given in a non-contracting State involving
the same cause of action and between the same parties,"'' it will not
be recognized under either Convention.
Certain primary questions as to status constitute mandatory
grounds for denial of recognition under the Conventions as well.'
The Conventions, at Article 27(4), require non-recognition:
if the court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judg-
ment, has decided a preliminary question concerning the status
or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out
of a matrimonial relationship, wills or succession in a way that
conflicts with a rule of the private international law of the State
in which the recognition is sought, unless the same result would
have been reached by the application of the rules of private in-
ternational law of that State.'93
Finally, unlike the earlier English scheme, attacks based on juris-
dictional defects in the rendering court rarely give rise to non-
recognition under the Conventions. Subject to limited exceptions, the
general rule is that "the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin
187. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(2) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(2). See also Dennis, supra note 98, at 2201.015.
188. Carver & Napier, supra note 110, at 237. "However, the enforcing court must apply
the law of the state in which the judgment originated and the provisions of any international con-
ventions in that state." Id. (citing Noirhomme v. Walklate [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 427; Isabelle
Lancray SA v. Peters und Sickert KG [1991] ILPr99, ECJ; Debaecker v. Bouwan [1986] 2
CMLR 400, ECJ; Pendy Plastics Products BV v. Pluspunkt [1983] 1 CMLR 665, ECJ; Klomps
v. Michel [1982] 2 CMLR 773, ECJ). See also Perkins, supra note 143, at 215.
189. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(3),(5) and The Lugano
Convention, supra note 138, Art. 27(3),(5).
190. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(3) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(3). This defense applies regardless whether the judgment of the
enforcing court is given prior to or subsequent to that of the original court. Dennis, supra note
98, at 2201.015.
191. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(5) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(5).
192. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(4) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(4).
193. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 27(4) and The Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 138, Art. 27(4).
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may not be reviewed" by the recognizing court.'94 Even where an ex-
ception exists, the recognizing court "shall be bound by the findings of
fact on which the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction. ' ' "'
Moreover, the Convention's public policy exception "may not be ap-
plied to the rules relating to jurisdiction." This rejection of jurisdic-
tional incompetence as a ground for non-recognition is perhaps the
Conventions' greatest departure from the earlier English practice of
foreign judgment recognition and enforcement.
Indeed, the methods by which foreign judgments are recognized
in England via international treaties, particularly the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, stand in stark contrast to the enigmatic patch-
work of various state approaches existing under the American scheme.
These treaties teach us that a foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement scheme that is both uniform and efficient can be achieved
through an international treaty that reduces the number of hurdles to
enforcement and provides for recognition by way of judgment regis-
tration procedures.
While the United States has not overlooked this valuable lesson,
efforts to reshape the American scheme have shifted, at leasttemporarily, toward a domestic, rather than international, resolution to
the issue of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement.
Currently, a proposed Foreign Judgment Recognition and
Enforcement Act is taking shape that, if enacted, would federalize
foreign judgment recognition procedures and bring the benefits of
foreign judgment registration to American courts. The next section
discusses the positive implications of the proposed act against a
backdrop of international negotiations that have both influenced and
redirected its purpose and direction.
IV. RESHAPING THE AMERICAN SCHEME
As Justice Gray noted over 100 years ago in Hilton v. Guyot,
"The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of [foreign judg-
ment recognition and enforcement] is a treaty or a statute of this coun-
try."' 96 Despite this open invitation by the Court, the United States
has yet to enact a federal statute or enter into a treaty that would gov-
ern and prescribe foreign judgment recognition and enforcement pro-
194. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 28 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 28.
195. Compare The Brussels Convention, supra note 139, Art. 28 and The Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 138, Art. 28.
196. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
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cedures on a national level.' 97 Unfortunately, the decision to create
and enter into an international treaty is a complex one--one that can-
not be made in a vacuum. As the next sections illustrate, while the
formulation of an acceptable treaty is an appropriate goal, the United
States could at least benefit in the interim by enacting federal legisla-
tion that would reshape the American scheme and create a system of
foreign judgment registration similar to that existing under the Eng-
lish scheme.
A. Reconstruction Through International Treaty
To date, American attempts at entering into an international re-
ciprocal treaty governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have proven less than fruitful. In 1976 the United States
and the United Kingdom initiated a "Convention on the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters," but
negotiations over the final text broke off in 1981.'98 More recently, the
Hague Convention on Private International Law (Hague Convention),
of which both England and the United States are members, 199 pro-
duced a proposed Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters."' Implementa-
tion of the Hague Convention would have had the effect of harmoniz-
ing jurisdictional requirements among Contracting States as well as
creating a uniform system of foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement similar to those existing under the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions." 1
197. See supra Part II. Arguably, the power to enact such a statute is vested in Congress by
the Commerce Clause, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
PROJECT, DISCUSSION DRAFT (March 29, 2002) [hereinafter Discussion Draft] (citing Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 70-71 (2d ed. 1996)) and any
treaty made "under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, constitutionally speaking, the United States had only to find
an appropriate conduit through which to exercise its powers-whether by international treaty,
federal legislation, or both.
198. See Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments, at
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/bul12.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
199. See Hague Member States, at http://www.hcch.net/e/members /members.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2002).
200. See Future Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/dgm.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2002) [hereinafter "Draft Convention"].
201. See Draft Convention, supra note 200, Ch II-III. See also Michael Traynor, An Intro-
ductory Framework for Analyzing the Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters: U.S. and European Prespectives, 6 Ann. Surv. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 5-11 (2000).
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As of the spring of 2001, however, negotiations under the Hague
Convention have been less than encouraging.0 2 Several topics, includ-
ing "e-commerce, jurisdiction based on activity, consumer and em-
ployment contracts, IP rights, and the relationship of the proposed
convention to regional regulations on jurisdiction" were considered
"so controversial that they threatened the possibility of an agree-
ment. ' 213  Currently, "it remains doubtful that a convention accept-
able to the United States will be agreed on."20 4
B. Reconstruction Through Federal Legislation
With the possibility of a consensus among members of the
Hague Convention looming far in the distance, efforts to unify the
American scheme have shifted toward the construction of a federal
statute, which would operate independently of any international
treaty.25 This section briefly discusses those efforts as reflected in the
American Law Institute's (ALI) recent International Jurisdiction and
Judgments Project20 6 and suggests that the success of this project
would provide a much-needed overhaul to the current American
scheme.
1. Proposed Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act
In May of 1999, the American Law Institute (ALI) undertook
the grand task of drafting "legislation to be submitted to Congress at
the same time that the [Hague] Convention was submitted to the Sen-
ate."207 The draft was to consist of two parts: "Title I to translate into
domestic law at the federal level the obligations undertaken in the
Convention; and Title II to provide for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign-country judgments of countries that have not joined
the convention. '"20' However, rather than completely abandon the
project after the deadlock at the Hague Convention, "the Council in
December 2000 and the Annual Meeting of the Institute in May 2001
202. E-mail from Manon Anne Ress, Ph.D., Research Associate, Essential Information, to
Brian Paige, Law Student, Gonzaga University School of Law, (Nov. 9, 2002, 17:34 PST) (on
file with author) ("Last spring, to avoid a deadlock over issues affecting electronic Commerce,
the conference decided to start from scratch with a new informal working group charged with
exploring the possibilities of a narrower treaty."). See also Discussion Draft, supra note 197, at 2.
203. Id. For more information concerning the current status of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law visit http://www.hcch.net.
204. Discussion Draft, supra note 197, at 1.
205. Discussion Draft, supra note 197, at Reporters' Memorandum, xvii.
206. For further information on the American Law Institute's International Jurisdiction
and Judgments Project visit http://www.ali.org.
207. Discussion Draft, supra note 197, at 1. See also Silberman, supra note 7, at 635-36.
208. Id. at 2.
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decided to ask the Reporters to go forward with what would have been
Title II of the proposed legislation, that is a federal Foreign Judgments
Recognition and Enforcement Act."2"9 After thorough discussion and
revision, the ALI Reporters recently completed a December 2002
council draft of the proposed act.
A final revision of the proposed act has yet to be approved by
both the Council and the membership of the ALI. Moreover, the
provisions of the proposed act will no doubt remain transitory until
they are solidified by Congressional enactment. The next section will
discuss the current draft of the proposed act in terms of its potential
impact upon the American scheme and will make reference to specific
provisions only as necessary to place the analysis in its proper context.
2. Benefits of the Proposed Act
The enactment of federal legislation based on the December
2002 council draft of the proposed act would result in a positive
change in the American scheme of foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement. The following are just a few examples.
At present, "the United States is in the anomalous position that a
judgment of the court of a foreign country may be recognized or en-
forced in one state of the United States, but not in another." '' Fed-
eral legislation would resolve this oddity by replacing the enigmatic
patchwork system existing among the states with a single national
scheme.
Such unification would also increase the likelihood that American
judgments will be recognized and enforced abroad. Throughout the
international community, several countries make recognition and en-
forcement contingent upon a finding of reciprocity. 212 As such, "a na-
tional standard would make the foreign court's inquiry substantially
easier.213
In addition to uniformity, federal legislation modeled on the De-
cember 2002 proposed act would give judgment creditors the option of
proceeding in state or federal court. As section 8(a) of the December
2002 draft provides:
209. Id. at 1-2.
210. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, COUNCIL DRAFT
NO. 3 (December 2002) [hereinafter Council Draft]. The author would like to personally thank
Michael Greenwald, Deputy Director of the American Law Institute, for providing me with this
draft.
211. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, REPORT 1 (April 14,
2000).
212. Zitter, supra note 44.
213. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, REPORT 5 (April 14,
2000).
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The district courts of the United States shall have original juris-
diction, concurrently with the courts of the States, over an action
brought to enforce a foreign judgment or to secure a declaration
with respect to recognition under this Act, without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties or the amount in contro-
214versy.
The judgment creditor's options would also extend to the man-
ner of enforcement procedures. In addition to enforcement through
the initiation of a civil action, foreign judgments would also be en-
forceable by way of registration procedures resembling those em-
ployed under the English scheme. 215  Thus, for the first time, judg-
ment creditors seeking to enforce foreign judgments in American
courts would be permitted to do so without the added expense of filing
a fresh cause of action.216
Finally, while a federal statute based on the proposed act would
operate independently of any Convention or treaty, "it could be modi-
fied to accommodate a Convention if one were to come to pass. ,
217
Thus, such a federal statute would serve as an appropriate interim step
as negotiations continue under the Hague Convention.
C. Conclusion
The United States and England currently stand on opposing
ends of the foreign judgment recognition and enforcement spectrum.
Both systems originate from similar common law. 21' However, from
that point forward, the two countries have charted different routes.
While the American scheme has yet to evolve past the state level, the
English scheme has grown to an international level through a series of
reciprocal foreign judgment recognition and enforcement treaties. As
214. Council Draft, supra note 210, §8(a).
215. Compare Council Draft, supra note 210, §§ 9-10, and supra Part III.A.2-3. Section
10(a) provides:
A money judgment entitled to recognition and enforcement under this Act, other than
a judgment rendered by default or a judgment subject to appeal, may be registered by
filing a certified copy of the judgment, together with a certified translation, as appro-
priate, in any district court of the United States, in accordance with the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1963. A judgment so filed shall have the same effect as a judgment of a
United States court, and may be enforced in like manner, except that the defenses to
enforcement are those stated in this Act.
Council Draft, supra note 210, §10(a).
216. Compare Proposed Act §10 and Part III.A.2-3. Comment (b) to §10 of the Proposed
Act states that "[tihe rationale for registration is that one court has heard both sides and made a
final determination, and that all that remains is collection of the sum awarded to the prevailing
party." Council Draft §10 cmt. b.
217. Discussion Draft supra note 197, at 2.
218. Compare supra Part II.A.1 and supra Part III.A.1.
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a result, England now possesses a foreign judgment and recognition
scheme that far exceeds that of the United States in terms of efficiency
and predictability.
Although the prospects of a treaty that would align the United
States with the English scheme remain in doubt, the United States
nonetheless would profit in the interim by enacting federal legislation
that would control the issue of foreign judgment recognition and en-
forcement on a national level.2 19 Not only would the implications of
such legislation greatly improve the American scheme, it would also
bring the United States one step closer to realizing the ultimate goal-
the United States' integration into an international, reciprocal foreign
judgment recognition and enforcement treaty.
219. See Discussion Draft supra note 197, at 3.
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